Read the extract below and answer the question that follows: with non- Deontologists typically supplement non-consequentialist obligations consequentialist permissions. That is, certain actions can be right even though not maximizing of good consequences, for the rightness of such actions consists in their instantiating certain norms (here, of permission and not of obligation). Such actions are permitted, not just in the weak sense that there is no obligation not to do them, but also in the strong sense that one is permitted to do them even though they are productive of less good consequences than their alternatives. Such strongly permitted actions include actions one is obligated to do, but (importantly) also included are actions one is not obligated to do. It is this last feature of such actions that warrants their separate mention for deontologists. Deontologists are committed to something like the doctrine of double effect, a long- established doctrine of Catholic theology. The Doctrine in its most familiar form asserts that we are categorically forbidden to intend evils such as killing the innocent or torturing others, even though doing such acts would minimize the doing of like acts by others (or even ourselves) in the future. By contrast, if we only risk, cause, or predict that our acts will have consequences making them acts of killing or of torture, then we might be able to justify the doing of such acts by the killing/torture-minimizing consequences of such actions. Whether such distinctions are plausible is standardly taken to measure the plausibility of an intention- focused version of the agent-centered version of deontology. (Source: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-deontological/ Question: With reference to the above extract, evaluate the Deontological theory as a source of ethics.