Respuesta :
Answer:
India and Pakistan have highly disparate goals for Afghanistan, and they thus undertake very
different activities there. Delhi has striven to bolster the government in Kabul and integrate
Afghanistan into wider regional political and economic structures. This has not been done out
of any sense of altruism. By strengthening Afghanistan, India advances its own national security objectives—namely, eliminating a critical safe haven for terrorists who have attacked India
and continue plotting to do so in the future, projecting power throughout South Asia (and
beyond), and gaining access to Central Asian trade and energy resources. Although Delhi’s
goals for Afghanistan certainly involve minimizing Islamabad’s influence there, the government’s overall policy is geared primarily to advancing India’s broader domestic and regional
interests independently of its rivalry with Pakistan.
In contrast, Pakistan’s goals for Afghanistan are mainly—although not exclusively—
India-centric and focus primarily on undermining Delhi’s influence in Afghanistan. Islamabad
seeks a weak Kabul government dominated by a pliant, supportive Taliban so that Pakistan can
maintain “strategic depth” against an Indian invasion, guarantee safe haven for Islamist proxies that it supports, prevent Delhi from projecting power in South Asia, and obstruct India’s
ability to support separatists in the Pakistani province of Balochistan. In Islamabad’s Afghanistan calculus, protecting itself against Indian encroachment takes precedence over pursuing
Pakistan’s broader geopolitical and economic goals. Part of the reason for this strategic orientation is the preeminent decisionmaking role played by Pakistan’s military, which emphasizes
security matters over virtually all other elements of foreign policy. So long as India is viewed as
an existential threat, and so long as the military plays a central role in setting Pakistani policy,
it is unlikely that there will be a fundamental shift in this policy bias.1
With its military-dominated decisionmaking apparatus focused on internal security concerns and on keeping other powers from exerting influence in Afghanistan, Pakistan has little
of positive value to offer Afghanistan or other countries in the region. Pakistan is not positioned well to boost trade, and it has demonstrated little willingness to take steps designed to
improve the lives of ordinary Afghans. By contrast, India’s democratic polity, institutionalized decisionmaking processes, relative internal stability, apolitical military, large consumer
base, and growing economy make it a far more palatable partner for Kabul. Thus, although
Hamid Karzai’s government has clearly been prepared to play India and Pakistan against one
another—often effectively—it has also taken explicit steps to distance itself from Islamabad
while embracing Delhi’s cooperation and assist