Consider a market with two​ firms, Hewlett-Packard​ (HP) and​ Dell, that sell printers. Both companies must choose whether to charge a high price ​($​) or a low price ​($​) for their printers. These price strategies with corresponding profits are depicted in the payoff matrixLOADING... to the right.​ HP's profits are in red and​ Dell's are in blue. Suppose HP and Dell are initially at the​ game's Nash equilibrium. ​Then, HP and Dell advertise that they will match any lower price of their competitors. For​ example, if HP charges ​$​, then Dell will match that price and also charge ​$. What effect will matching prices have on profits​ (relative to the Nash equilibrium without price​ matching)? Assuming HP and Dell can coordinate to maximize​ profits, HP's profit will change by ​$ nothing and​ Dell's profit will change by nothing. ​(Enter either positive or negative numeric responses using​ integers.)